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A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide 
sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue we 
present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We find that cooperation 
decreases with experience when it cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome. More 
interestingly, the converse is not necessarily true: cooperation does not always increase 
with experience when it can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Nor is a more 
stringent condition, risk dominance, sufficient for cooperation to arise. However, subjects 
do learn to cooperate when the payoff to cooperation and the importance of the future is 
high enough. These results have important implications for the theory of infinitely 
repeated games. While we show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated 
games, the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the sub-game 
perfect conditions usually considered. 
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Introduction 
 
A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not 
provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria.
1 For example, in 
infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games with patient agents, both cooperate and 
defect may be played in equilibrium. 
Even though the theory of infinitely repeated games has been used to explain 
cooperation in a variety of environments, no definitive solution has been provided to the 
problem of equilibrium selection: when both cooperation and defection are possible 
equilibrium outcomes, which one should we expect to prevail? Previous experimental 
evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate in a specific equilibrium when 
they play a small number of infinitely repeated games: some subjects attempt to establish 
cooperative agreements while others defect. But how would behavior evolve as subjects 
learn from previous repeated games? Would cooperation prevail when it can be supported 
in equilibrium? Or are subjects condemned to learn that defection is the best individual 
action? 
We present evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games 
based on a series of experiments. For a given continuation probability and cooperation 
payoff, each subject participated in between 23 and 77 infinitely repeated games. This 
allows us to study how cooperation evolves as subject gain experience. First, we find that 
in treatments in which cooperation cannot be supported in equilibrium, the level of 
cooperation decreases with experience and converges to levels comparable to those 
observed in one-shot prisoners’ dilemma games. This supports the idea that being a 
possible equilibrium action is a necessary condition for cooperation to arise with 
experience. 
Second, we find that in treatments in which cooperation can be supported in 
equilibrium, the level of cooperation does not necessarily increase and may remain at low 
levels. When cooperation can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium, subjects 
may fail to make the most of it: being a possible equilibrium outcome is not enough for 
                                                 
1 Fudenberg and Maskin (1993), for example, state that “The theory of repeated games has been 
somewhat disappointing. …the theory does not make sharp predictions.”   3
cooperation to rise with experience. Together, this evidence suggests that while being an 
equilibrium action may be a necessary condition for cooperation to arise with experience, 
it is not sufficient. 
Third, we find that cooperation being both an equilibrium action and a risk 
dominant action (as defined later) is not sufficient either for cooperation to rise with 
experience. Risk dominance has been used as a selection criterion in the study of 
coordination games. While the experimental evidence on one-shot coordination games 
suggests that actions that are both Pareto efficient and risk-dominant are usually selected, 
our evidence suggests that those conditions are not sufficient in infinitely repeated games. 
However, we do observe that it is possible for subjects to learn to cooperate and reach 
high level of cooperation if the payoff from cooperation and the probability of future 
interactions are high enough. In infinitely repeated games, for cooperation to rise to high 
levels more is needed than just being an equilibrium and risk dominant action. 
These results show how difficult it is for cooperation to arise even for experienced 
subjects. These results cast doubt on the common assumption that subjects will make the 
most of the opportunity to cooperate whenever it is possible to do so in equilibrium.  
  While there is a previous experimental literature in infinitely repeated games, this 
literature has not focused on the evolution of cooperation. Previous experimental 
evidence on infinitely repeated games has shown that cooperation is greater when it can 
be supported in equilibrium but that subjects fail to make the most of the opportunity to 
cooperate (see Roth and Murnighan, 1978, Murnighan and Roth, 1983, Palfrey and 
Rosenthal, 1994, Aoyagi and Fréchette, 2003, and Dal Bó, 2005). In addition, Dal Bó 
(2005) compares infinitely repeated and finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games of 
the same expected length and finds that cooperation is larger in the former as theory 
predicts.
2 Aoyagi and Fréchette (2003) show that in infinitely repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma games with imperfect public monitoring the level of cooperation increases with 
the quality of the public signal. Duffy and Ochs (2003) compare the levels of cooperation 
in random matching and fixed matching infinitely repeated games with high continuation 
probability. They find that cooperation increases as subjects gain more experience under 
                                                 
2 Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) compares finitely and infinitely repeated trust games finding similar 
results.  For more evidence on repeated trust games see Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006).   4
fixed matching but not under random matching. Our experimental design differs from the 
previous literature in that, for several combinations of continuation probabilities and 
payoffs to cooperation, we allow subjects to participate in a large number of repeated 
games. In this way we can study how cooperation evolves under different treatments as 
subjects gain experience. 
  There have been theoretical attempts to solve the problem of multiplicity of 
equilibria in infinitely repeated games. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Boyd and 
Lorberbaum (1987), Boyd (1989), Kim (1994), and Bendor and Swistak (1997) apply the 
concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) by Maynard Smith’s (1982) -- or 
modifications -- to infinitely repeated games with varied implications regarding the 
selection of equilibria. There is also a literature that appeals to bounded rationality, in the 
form of finite automata. Rubinstein (1986) and Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) look at the 
set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games played by infinitely patient finite automata 
with lexicographic costs of complexity and find that whether efficiency can be achieved 
depends on the particular equilibrium concept. Binmore and Samuelson (1992), Cooper 
(1996) and Volij (2002) apply evolutionary refinements to infinitely repeated games 
played by finite automata and find that the set of possible payoffs depends radically on 
the definition of ESS and the way costs of complexity are modeled (also see Fudenberg 
and Maskin, 1990 and 1993). Blonski and Spagnolo (2001) appeal to the concept of risk 
dominance as an equilibrium selection criteria in infinitely repeated games. In contrast, 
Volij (2002) shows that always defect is the unique stochastically stable strategy 
(Kandori et al., 1993, and Young, 1993) in games with finite automata. Johnson, Levine 
and Pesendorfer (2001) study stochastically stable strategies in a random matching gift-
giving repeated game with local information systems. They find that cooperation (gift-
giving) is stochastically stable only if the payoff from cooperation is above a critical 
value which exceeds what is required by sub-game perfection (see also Levine and 
Pesendorfer 2007). 
This variety of theoretical results underscores the need for empirical data to solve 
the issue of multiplicity of equilibria in infinitely repeated games. The experimental 
results we present can inform future theories. Theories claiming that subjects will 
coordinate on defection even when they are infinitely patient and theories claiming that   5
they will always coordinate on cooperation are not supported by the data. However, we 
find empirical support for theories predicting cooperation under sufficiently favorable 
conditions. 
 
2. Experimental design 
 
  This experiment consists of 18 sessions. In each session, a set of subjects 
participated anonymously through computers in a sequence of infinitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma games. We induce an infinitely repeated game in the lab by having a 
random continuation rule: after each round the computer decided whether to finish the 
repeated game or have an additional round depending on a random number. We consider 
two probabilities of continuation: δ=1/2 and δ=3/4. The stage game is the simple 
prisoners’ dilemma game in Table 1 where the payoffs are denoted in cents and where the 
payoff to cooperation takes one of three possible values: R=32, 40 and 48. 
 
Table 1: Stage Game Payoffs (in cents) 
 C  D 
C R,  R  12,  50 
D  50, 12  25, 25 
 
 
  Therefore we have two main treatment variables, the probability of continuation 
and the payoff from cooperation, resulting in a total of six treatments. Each session 
consisted of a sequence of infinitely repeated games for one treatment only (between 
subjects design) and we run three sessions per treatment. In each session subjects 
participate in as many repeated games as was possible in one hour of play (the first 
repeated game to end after one hour of play marks the end of the session). Subjects were 
randomly re-matched with another subject after the end of a repeated game.
3 Different 
                                                 
3 Random matching allows for a larger number of repeated games in a session than alternative matching 
protocols like complete strangers or turnpike protocols. The possibility of a pair of subjects interacting 
together in more than one repeated game is not likely to be a problem for several reasons. First, our results 
in section 4 suggest that the matching protocol does not introduce additional repeated games effects –for 
example, cooperation reaches one-shot levels when it cannot be supported in equilibrium. Second, Duffy 
and Ochs (2003) found that cooperative norms do not emerge under random matching. Third, Dal Bó   6
groups of subjects participated in each session. The instructions for one of the sessions 
are in the online appendix.
4 
  The treatments and results are organized around three questions that derive from 
the theoretical background described in the next section. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
 
  If we assume that the payoffs in Table 1 are the actual total payoffs the subjects 
obtain form the stage game and that this is common knowledge, the set of subgame 
perfect equilibria can be calculated using the results from Stahl (1991). Table 2 indicates 




Table 2: Cooperation in Equilibrium 
  R=32 R=40 R=48 
δ =1/2  NO  YES  YES 
δ=3/4  YES YES YES 
 
 
 Under  δ=1/2 & R=32, only defection is a possible equilibrium action and we 
expect that as subjects gain experience the levels of cooperation decrease to one-shot 
levels. However past experimental evidence indicates that there are games in which 
observed behavior does not converge to the unique equilibrium leading to the following 
question. 
  QUESTION 1: Do subjects learn to defect when it is the only equilibrium action? 
  
  Under all treatments except δ=1/2 & R=32 cooperation can be supported in 
equilibrium
6 and we may expect that cooperation increases with experience and reaches 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2005) uses a turnpike protocol with results consistent with other studies that have used random matching 
protocols. 
4 Available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/print/df_online_appendix.pdf. 
5 More precisely, the critical value of δ over which cooperation can be supported in equilibrium is 0.72 
under R=23, 0.4 under R=40, and 0.8 under R=48. 
6 In fact, it can be shown following Stahl (1991) that for all the treatments, but δ=1/2 and R=32, the whole 
set of feasible and individually rational payoff can be supported in equilibrium. In addition, mutual   7
levels close to 100%. However, there is a multiplicity of equilibria under the treatments 
for which cooperation can be supported. While we may assume that subjects will learn to 
coordinate on the Pareto efficient equilibrium, this may not be the case. As shown by an 
extensive literature on coordination games, subjects may fail to coordinate on the Pareto 
efficient equilibrium if the costs from not coordinating are too high for the subject 
playing the Pareto efficient action (see Cooper et al., 1990, and Van Huyck et al., 1990).
7 
These alternative hypotheses lead us to the following question. 
  QUESTION 2: Do subjects learn to cooperate when it is an equilibrium action? 
  
Previous literature has studied the concept of risk-dominance as an alternative 
equilibrium selection criterion. Risk-dominance was introduced by Harsanyi and Selten 
(1988) and concerns the pairwise comparison between Nash equilibria. In 2x2 
coordination games an equilibrium is risk-dominant if its equilibrium strategy is a best 
response to a mixture that assigns probability of one-half to each strategy by the other 
player. While risk-dominance is easy to define and use in 2x2 games, it presents 
complications in general simultaneous-moves games. Its application to infinitely repeated 
games also faces the problem that two or more strategies can be identical to each other on 
the path of the game making it impossible to rank them (for example, consider different 
trigger strategies). Given the difficulties applying the concept of risk-dominance to the 
whole set of possible strategies in infinitely repeated games we focus only on a pairwise 
comparison of all strategies that support cooperation against the ultimate defection 
strategy: “always defect” (AD). Blonksi and Spagnolo (2001) show that the strategy 
“grim” (G) risk dominates AD if there is any cooperative strategy that dominates AD.
8 In 
                                                                                                                                                 
cooperation can be supported in these five treatments with continuation payoffs in the efficient frontier of 
the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Therefore, mutual cooperation is renegotiation proof 
under most renegotiation proofness concepts in the five treatment in which it can be supported in 
equilibrium (see Bernheim and Ray, 1989, and Farrell and Maskin, 1989; also see Pearce, 1992, and 
references therein, for a review of the different renegotiation proofness concepts). 
7 This is not to say that subjects never coordinate on the efficient outcome, but rather that they sometimes 
do not. Charness, Fréchette and Qin (2006) provide an example where subjects often do coordinate on the 
efficient outcome in a game where the possibility of contingent rewards transform (in equilibrium) the 
second stage game to a coordination game. 
8 The grim strategy is the strategy that starts by cooperating and continues to do so as long as the other 
player cooperates, but defects forever following a defection by the other player.   8
other words, G is the “less risky” of the cooperative strategies when matched with 
someone playing AD, and we only need to focus on the comparison between G and AD.  
Table 3 shows the treatments under which G is risk-dominant against AD.
9  
 
Table 3: Risk-Dominant Cooperation 
  R=32 R=40 R=48 
δ=1/2 NO  NO  YES 
δ=3/4 NO  YES YES 
 
 
If subjects learn to cooperate when cooperation is an efficient equilibrium action 
and is also risk-dominant (as defined above and argued by Blonksi and Spagnolo, 2001), 
we should observe that cooperation increases with experience and reaches levels close to 
100% under the following three treatments: δ=1/2 & R=48, δ=3/4 & R=40, and δ=3/4 & 
R=48. This reasoning leads us to the following question. 
  QUESTION 3: Do subjects learn to cooperate when it is risk-dominant? 
 
4. Experimental Results 
 
We conducted 18 experimental sessions between July 2005 and March 2006. A 
total of 266 subjects participated in the experiment, with an average of 14.78 subjects per 
session, a maximum of 20 and a minimum of 12. The subjects were NYU undergraduates 
recruited through email solicitation at the beginning of the semester. The subjects earned 
an average of $25.95, with a maximum of $42.93 and a minimum of $16.29. In the 
treatments with δ=1/2 and δ=3/4 the average number of rounds per match was 1.96 and 
4.42 respectively, and the maximum was 9 and 23 respectively. Some descriptive 




                                                 
9 More precisely, the critical value of δ over which G is risk-dominant against AD is 0.82 under R=32, 0.61 
under R=40, and 0.39 under R=48. 
   9
 
 
Table 4: Session characteristics 
Delta 0.5  Delta 0.75 
Sessions 
Payoff from 
cooperation  32 40 48 
Payoff from 
cooperation  32 40 48 
1-6  Number of subjects  16  14  14  Number of subjects  14  12  16 
  Number of Games  69  72  72  Number of Games  29  34  35 
  Number of rounds  2.01  2.08  2.01  Number of rounds  5.55  3.94  4.31 
  Average  Payoff  24.22 29.17 30.44  Average  Payoff  28.39 31.35 42.93 
  Maximum  Payoff  22.29 24.90 28.05  Maximum  Payoff  26.26 29.78 39.99 
  Minimum  Payoff  18.79 22.10 25.20  Minimum  Payoff  24.60 27.65 35.23 
7-12  Number of subjects  12  16  14  Number of subjects  16  14  12 
  Number of Games  71  71  68  Number of Games  33  47  29 
  Number of rounds  1.89  2.03  2.00  Number of rounds  4.58  3.15  5.14 
  Average  Payoff  21.45 26.26 26.62  Average  Payoff  26.47 29.29 39.56 
  Maximum  Payoff  20.53 23.71 23.82  Maximum  Payoff  24.14 27.41 36.63 
    Minimum  Payoff  17.75 21.61 21.43  Minimum  Payoff  21.02 25.55 33.32 
13-18  Number of subjects  16  20  18  Number of subjects  14  12  16 
  Number of Games  59  72  77  Number of Games  27  23  32 
  Number of rounds  2.05  1.74  1.84  Number of rounds  4.70  5.43  4.06 
  Average  Payoff  19.50 22.05 29.36  Average  Payoff  21.59 27.58 34.71 
  Maximum  Payoff  18.35 20.15 27.39  Maximum  Payoff  20.51 24.97 30.98 
  Minimum  Payoff  16.29 18.16 25.01  Minimum  Payoff  19.57 23.91 25.76 
 
4.1 General description of behavior. 
Before answering the questions from the previous sections we provide a general 
description of the observed behavior. The first panel in Table 5 shows cooperation rates 
by treatment for the first repeated game, on the left for the first round and on the right for 
all rounds. Looking separately at first rounds is of importance since different repeated 
games may result in a different number of rounds and the percentage of cooperation may 
vary across rounds. Cooperation is significantly larger under δ=3/4 & R=48 than under 
δ=1/2 & R=32 in the first repeated game (p-value of 0.032 and 0.002 for first round and 
all rounds respectively).
10 In addition, cooperation tends to be higher in treatments under 
which cooperation can be supported as an equilibrium action than when it cannot be 
                                                 
10 The statistical tests are t-tests with the variance-covariance modified by clustering at the subject level. 
This is true of every test reported unless noted otherwise. The qualitative results are largely robust to 
clustering at the session level or using the nonparametric Wilcoxon test with session averages as 
observations. The results on the evolution of cooperation that we present in the following sections are also 
largely robust to considering linear trends. Results from using these alternative statistical tests are provided 
in the online appendix at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/print/df_online_appendix.pdf.   10
supported, but this difference is only significant for first rounds (p-values of 0.087 and 
0.167 for first rounds and all rounds respectively). However, it is not the case that an 
increase in the probability of continuation always results in an increase in cooperation 
(compare the two treatments with R=40) and increases in the payoff from cooperation has 
no significant effects on cooperation. 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Cooperation by Treatment 
First Repeated Game 
First Round  All Rounds 
δ \ R  32    40    48  δ \ R  32    40    48 
0.5  34.09  <*  54.00 < 56.52 0.5 28.33 <  39.80  <  41.38 
 =    v    ^      v    v*    ^ 
0.75 34.09  <  36.84  <*  56.82  0.75 21.76  <  26.36  <***  56.10 
                         
All Repeated Games 
First Round  All Rounds 
δ \ R  32    40    48  δ \ R  32    40    48 
0.5 9.81  <***  18.72  <***  38.97  0.5 9.82  <***  17.98  <***  35.29 
  ^***   ^***    ^***      ^***   ^***    ^*** 
0.75 25.61  <***  61.10  <***  85.07  0.75 20.25  <***  58.71  <***  76.42 
                     
Note: * significance at 10%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. 
 
  The second panel of Table 5 shows cooperation rates for all repeated games. 
Here, increases in the probability of continuation or the payoff of cooperation result in a 
significant increase in cooperation (p-value of less than 0.001 and 0.001 for first round 
and all rounds respectively). In addition, cooperation is significantly greater in treatments 
under which cooperation can be supported as an equilibrium action than when it cannot 
be supported (p-values of less than 0.001 and 0.001 for first rounds and all rounds 
respectively). 
  These differences between behavior in the first match and all matches suggest that 
experience affects how subjects play in repeated games in an important way. The next 
sections focus on how subjects modify their behavior as they gain experience. 
 
4.2 Do subjects learn to defect when it is the only equilibrium action? 
  To answer this question we study the evolution of cooperation under δ=1/2 & 
R=32, the treatment in which cooperation cannot be supported in equilibrium. The first   11
column of Table 6 shows the percentage of subjects that choose to cooperate in the first 
round of each repeated game in this treatment with the repeated games aggregated 
according to the interaction in which they started.
11 To compare inexperienced versus 
experienced play we compare behavior in the first 10 interactions with those in 
interactions 111 to 120.
12 
 
Table 6: Percentage of Cooperation by Equilibrium Conditions (First Rounds) 
  First Round  All Rounds 
Repeated Game Begins  Cooperation is  Cooperation is 
In Interaction  Not SGPE SGPE Not  SGPE SGPE 
1-10 28.57  39.11  21.00  34.42 
11-20 13.04  28.54  12.91  27.19 
21-30 12.23  31.01  11.97  33.61 
31-40 10.61  36.04  10.51  38.64 
41-50 10.20  34.88  7.85  34.98 
51-60 9.75  41.47  6.54  39.85 
61-70 7.14  37.89  8.09  40.02 
71-80 5.65  36.86  4.48  39.73 
81-90 4.72  38.60  6.20  44.39 
91-100 6.11  40.91  7.91  47.11 
101-110 6.64  45.38  11.99  46.12 
111-120 5.50  49.77  6.45  55.88 
121-130 5.77  45.95  11.11  43.31 
131-140 8.33  47.43  9.17  42.99 
141-   46.32    47.83 
 
  Cooperation was 29% in the first round of the repeated games that begin within 
the first 10 interactions, dropping to 5.5% in the repeated games that begin within 
interactions 111 to 120 (this difference is significant with p-value below 0.01). For any 
repeated game that starts after 50 interactions cooperation is always below 10%. These 
levels are similar to the levels observed in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas (for example see 
Cooper et al, 1996, Dal Bó, 2005 and Bereby-Meyer and Roth, 2006). The evolution of 
cooperation is similar if we aggregate the data from all rounds (see column 3 in Table 6). 
                                                 
11 We use the word interaction to number each decision stage regardless of the repeated game. For example, 
if the first repeated game lasted for 5 rounds, the first round of the second repeated game is the sixth 
interaction. We use the word round to number decision stages inside a repeated game. 
12 We do have data on repeated games that started even later, but because there are slight variations in total 
number of interactions and length of particular repeated games across sessions, the sample size is stable 
only up to interactions 111-120.   12
We also reach similar conclusions if we present the data in groups of 10 repeated games 
instead of interactions. 
  From the aggregated data in this treatment it is clear that subjects learn to defect 
and cooperation reaches negligible levels when cooperation cannot be supported in 
equilibrium. We reach a similar conclusion when we study the evolution of cooperation 
in each session under this treatment. Figure 1 displays the proportion of cooperation in 
the first round of each repeated game by session and treatment. The first graph in Figure 
1 displays the evolution of cooperation for the three sessions with δ=1/2 & R=32: session 
1 as a solid line, 2 as dashed line and 3 as a dash-dotted line. It is clear from this graph 
that cooperation decreases with experience in all three sessions. 
 
4.3 Do subjects learn to cooperate when it is an equilibrium action? 
  The second column in Table 6 shows the percentage of subjects that choose to 
cooperate in the first round of the repeated games under which cooperation can be 
supported in sub-game perfect equilibrium. Initially, cooperation was 39%, but in 
repeated games after 111 to 120 rounds of experience cooperation increased to 50% (p-
value of the difference less than 0.01). We observe a similar evolution of cooperation 
from all the rounds in the repeated games (see the fourth column in Table 6). In addition, 
there are important differences with respect to the treatment in which cooperation is not a 
possible equilibrium outcome. The difference in cooperation rates across the equilibrium 
and non equilibrium situation is statistically significant for the first 10 interactions (p-
value < 0.05) and even more so for the repeated games that start after 111-120 
interactions (p-value < 0.01) for both first round and all rounds. 
These results support the idea that subjects improve their ability to make the most 
of the opportunity to cooperate as they gain experience, but only slightly. They are still 
very far from all coordinating on the efficient outcome. 
  The study of each session separately shows that cooperation being a possible 
equilibrium outcome does not necessarily lead to high levels of cooperation as subjects 
gain experience. The last five graphs in Figure 1 displays the evolution of cooperation by 
session and treatment for the treatments in which cooperation can be supported. Note that 
cooperation is lower in the last repeated game than in the first repeated game in 8 of these   13
sessions and it is higher in 7. While there is large variation in the evolution of 
cooperation across these treatments, it is clear that cooperation being a possible 
equilibrium outcome does not necessarily lead to increasing levels of cooperation as 
subjects gain experience. 
 
4.4 Do subjects learn to cooperate when it is risk-dominant to do so? 
  In this section we examine whether subgame perfection combined with risk 
dominance may be sufficient for subjects to learn to make the most of the opportunities 
for cooperation. Table 7 shows the percentage of subjects that choose to cooperate in the 
first round and all rounds of the repeated games for treatments under which cooperation 
is an equilibrium, separately by whether cooperation is risk dominant (δ=1/2 & R=48, 
δ=3/4 & R=40, and δ=3/4 & R=48) or not (δ=1/2 & R=40, and δ=3/4 & R=32).  
 
Table 7: Percentage of Cooperation by Risk Dominance (First Rounds)* 
  First Round  All Rounds 
Repeated Game Begins  Cooperation is  Cooperation is 
in Interaction  Not RD  RD  Not RD  RD 
1-10 31.43  46.53  23.56  42.11 
11-20 20.60  36.26  18.10  35.09 
21-30 14.86  44.34  13.48  45.36 
31-40 14.01  51.83  14.63  52.72 
41-50 14.21  53.99  13.81  53.09 
51-60 18.51  57.47  16.32  61.30 
61-70 17.54  48.98  19.21  54.44 
71-80 20.32  50.00  19.10  55.99 
81-90 20.57  58.42  20.75  60.89 
91-100 22.01  54.88  19.28  66.45 
101-110 17.93  67.62  19.50  66.92 
111-120 22.46  70.61  22.60  73.86 
121-130 21.03  62.05  21.99  59.60 
131-140 30.70  59.49  26.23  61.40 
141- 23.86  65.69  16.57  76.82 
*Only considers treatments in which cooperation is a SGPE action. 
  
Table 7 shows that while cooperation decreases with experience when it is not 
risk-dominant, it increases with experience when it is risk dominant. While in the first 
rounds of the early repeated games in the risk-dominant treatments cooperation was 
46.5%, in later repeated games (after 110 interactions) it reached 70.6% (p-value less   14
than 0.01). We observe a similar evolution for all rounds. These aggregated data suggests 
that being a possible equilibrium outcome and risk-dominant does lead to increasing 
levels of cooperation as subjects gain experience. The difference in cooperation rates 
across the risk-dominant and non-risk-dominant case is statistically significant both at the 
beginning and for the repeated games that start after 111-120 interactions for both first 
and all rounds (p-values < 0.01). Nonetheless, the cooperation rate when cooperation is 
risk-dominant and after subjects have gained much experience is still far away from full 
cooperation. 
  We reach an even more nuanced conclusion if we study these treatments by 
session. The graphs in Figure 1 for δ=1/2 & R=48, δ=3/4 & R=40, and δ=3/4 & R=48 
display the evolution of cooperation for the sessions under the treatments in which 
cooperation can be supported and is risk-dominant. Cooperation is lower in the last 
repeated game than in the first repeated game in 3 sessions and higher in 6. While there is 
large variation in the evolution of cooperation, it is clear that cooperation being risk-
dominant does not necessarily lead to increasing levels of cooperation as subjects gain 
experience. However, all session in the treatment with δ=3/4 & R=48 reach high levels of 
cooperation. This suggests that if both the probability of continuation and the payoff of 
cooperation are high enough it is possible for subjects to make the most of the 
opportunity to cooperate. 
 
4.5 Strategies 
  It is of interest to study the strategies used by subjects. Unfortunately, looking at 
the individual data does not allow one to identify the strategies. For example, observing a 
pair of subjects that cooperate in every round is consistent with a number of cooperative 
strategies like always cooperate (AC) and any kind of trigger strategy including grim (G). 
However, it is still possible and interesting to study what proportion of the observed 
behavior is consistent with some theoretically important strategies and how their 
prevalence changes with the treatment variables. 
  Table 8 indicates the fraction of behavior consistent with the strategies always 
defect (AD), always cooperate (AC), grim trigger strategy (G), and tit-for-tat (TFT). Note   15
that AD and AC are mutually exclusive but AC, G and TFT are all consistent with a 
subject that cooperates in every round if the other player always cooperates as well.
13 
 
Table 8: Categorization of Observed Behavior 
All Repeated Games 











  R = 32  86.37  6.31  7.91  7.98  94.28 
δ = 0.5  R = 40  74.30  12.50  15.37 15.46  89.68 
  R = 48  56.28  31.47  33.74 33.65  90.02 
  R = 32  61.20  11.74  15.24 16.01  76.45 
δ = 0.75  R = 40  26.90  47.69  49.85 50.89  76.75 
  R = 48  8.59  68.80  74.51 75.00  83.10 
  Average 59.93  24.87  27.61 27.85  87.54 
 
Repeated Games that Start In the First 10 Interactions 
 
  R = 32  62.95  14.73  21.43 21.43  84.38 
δ = 0.5  R = 40  60.82  19.88  27.19 27.19  88.01 
  R = 48  49.16  35.29  35.29 34.03  84.45 
  R = 32  65.91  13.64  18.94 18.94  84.85 
δ = 0.75  R = 40  42.24  20.69  21.55 20.69  63.79 
  R = 48  24.26  30.88  38.24 41.18  62.50 
  Average 53.45  22.64  27.53 27.53  80.98 
 
Repeated Games that Start In Interactions 110-120 
 
  R = 32  90.50  1.50  4.50  5.00  95.00 
δ = 0.5  R = 40  72.38  16.67  19.52 18.57  91.90 
  R = 48  49.51  36.89  37.86 38.84  87.38 
  R = 32  64.63  14.02  17.07 17.68  81.71 
δ = 0.75  R = 40  23.08  54.81  58.65 59.62  81.73 
  R = 48  0.00  92.22  93.33 95.00  93.33 
  Average 53.1  33.83  36.18 36.75  89.28 
 
  The percentage of observed behavior that can be explained by AD is decreasing in 
the probability of future interaction and the payoff to cooperation (from 86% of the 
observations under δ=1/2 & R=32 to 9% under δ=3/4 & R=48). In contrast, the 
percentage that can be explained by the cooperative strategies (AC, G, and TFT) is 
                                                 
13 If two subjects (1 pair) played one repeated game and one subject always cooperated while the other 
always defected, the fraction of behavior consistent with AD would be 0.5, the fraction consistent with AC 
would also be 0.5 and the fraction consistent with G and TFT would be 0. If on the other hand both subjects 
always cooperated, then the fraction of AD would be 0, and for all others (AC, G, TFT) it would be 1.   16
increasing in the probability of future interaction and the payoff to cooperation. For 
example, the percentage of observations that can be explained by G goes from 8% under 
δ=1/2 & R=32 to 75% under δ=3/4 & R=48. These differences increase with experience 
as the comparison of the second two panels of Table 8 show. For example, in the repeated 
games starting in interactions 110 to 120 AD and G explain respectively 90% and 5% of 
the observations under δ=1/2 & R=32 and 0% and 93% under δ=3/4 & R=48. 
  Finally, note that focusing on AD and G allows us to explain an important part of 
the data (88%) and this percentage increases with experience. 
 
5. Cooperation in the long run 
 
  The analysis of the evolution of cooperation as subjects gain experience thus far is 
limited by the number of repeated games that a subject may play in a given session (in 
this case the subjects played between 23 and 77 repeated games). In this section we study 
how behavior would evolve under an even greater number of repeated games by 
estimating a model of learning based on our experimental data and carrying out 
simulations that allow us to study the evolution of cooperation over a longer period than 
what we are able to observe in the laboratory. 
  To motivate our learning model we start by focusing on AD and G strategies and 
calculating the basins of attraction of each strategy.
14 Imagine that someone is 
considering whether to play AD or G. This subject needs to determine which of these two 
strategies is the most profitable in expectation based on his beliefs about the probability 
that his partner with will play AD or G. In Figure 1 the horizontal dotted line represents 
the belief that would leave the subject indifferent between the two strategies for each 
treatment.
15 If the belief falls below the dotted line the subject will maximize his 
expected payoff by playing AD and if the belief is above the line, choosing G will 
maximize the expected payoff. These lines denote the limits of the basin of attraction of 
                                                 
14 As mentioned earlier (see Table 8), almost 90% of the entire data set is consistent with the AD and G 
strategies. Thus focusing on those will substantially simplify the analysis without being to far from the 
actual data. These 2 particular strategies also have the advantage of being very familiar to theorists. 
15 There is no indifference line for δ=1/2 and R=32 since G is never a best response in this treatment.  For 
the other treatments it is 0.72, and 0.38 for δ equal to 0.5 in increasing order of R and 0.81, 0.27, and 0.16 
for δ equal to 0.75 again in the order of increasing R.   17
the two strategies. As can be seen in Figure 1, when cooperation starts below the limit of 
the basins of attraction it is more likely that cooperation will diminish with experience 
while the opposite happens when cooperation starts above the limit. 
  The fact that basins of attractions seem to explain how behavior separates across 
treatments is very suggestive of an adaptive model of behavior. It may be that after 
learning the rules of the game, subjects form beliefs about the fraction of subjects that 
will play G and the fraction that will play AD. Given these beliefs they choose the 
strategy that would maximize their expected payoffs, and play according to that strategy. 
Upon observing the behavior of their partners, subjects update their beliefs and this 
determines the strategy used in the repeated games that follow. If this explanation is 
correct, we should observe a positive correlation between a subject’s first round choice 
and the first round choice of his partner in the previous repeated game. Table 9 shows the 
results from a random effects Probit estimation of the first round decision as a function of 
the first round choice of the previous repeated game partner. We control for the 
individual choices in round 1 of the first repeated game to allow the mean of the random 
effects to be different for subjects who cooperated and those who did not in the first 
decision of the entire experiment. The coefficient ρ gives the fraction of the variance 
attributable to the subject specific component. 
 
Table 9: Effect of Past Observations on Round 1 Cooperation 
(Correlated Random Effects Probit) 
  δ = 0.5  δ = 0.75 
  R = 32  R = 40  R = 48  R = 32  R = 40  R = 48 
Opponent Cooperated in 
Round  0.426*** 0.349*** 0.590*** 0.391*** 0.920***  0.857*** 
1 of Last Repeated Game  (0.117)  (0.070) (0.064) (0.105) (0.117)  (0.130) 
Cooperated in Round 1  1.149***  0.721*** 1.564***  0.497  1.725***  0.495 
Of First Repeated Game  (0.218)  (0.245) (0.347) (0.375) (0.498)  (0.346) 
Constant  -2.167*** -1.687*** -1.719*** -1.277*** -0.653**  0.568** 
  (0.144) (0.186) (0.184) (0.232) (0.306)  (0.261) 







  (0.063) (0.057) (0.053) (0.069) (0.066)  (0.079) 
Observations  2840 3534 3300 1268 1304  1376 
Number  of  Subjects  44 50 46 44 38  44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
§ significant at the 1% level using a likelihood ratio test   18
  The variable of interest, partner’s choice in round 1 of the last repeated game, is 
statistically significant and positive in every treatment. This suggests that, when a subject 
observes his partner cooperating, he is more likely to start by cooperating himself in the 
following repeated game.  
 
5.1 A Learning Model 
  Given the evidence that subjects modify their behavior as a function of the 
observed behavior of their partners from previous repeated games we study in this section 
a model in which subjects learn from the behavior of their partners about the distributions 
of strategies in the population. 
  We model the way subjects update their beliefs about the probability of facing 
different strategies using a belief based learning model (see Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998). Estimating a learning model from repetitions of randomly terminated repeated 
games can be difficult as the set of possible strategies within a repeated game can be 
extremely large. However, since more than three quarters of the data can be explained by 
two very simple strategies (AD and G), as seen in section 4.5, we will abstract from the 
complexities of the repeated game by reducing it to the choice in round 1: defect 
corresponds to AD and cooperate corresponds to G. The expected return from each 
choice is given by the theoretical values. Using the theoretical values has the advantage 
that it is not affected by the small sample variations in the sample, but implies that 
subjects think everyone else is using either AD or G perfectly. 
  We will estimate a model which allows for behavior ranging from Cournot to 
fictitious play, as in Crawford (1995) and Cheung and Friedman (1997). The learning 
model is as follows. Subjects in the first repeated game have beliefs about the probability 
their partner uses either AD or G. These beliefs are tracked by two variables: 
AD
it β  and 
G







it β β β + . In the first repeated game each subject has a given
AD
i1 β  and 
G
i1 β . After 






it a + = + β θ β  
where  i θ discounts past beliefs ( 0 = i θ  gives Cournot dynamics and  1 = i θ  is fictitious 
play), k is the action and  ) ( 1
k
j a  is an indicator function that takes value 1 if subject j (with   19
whom i is paired) took the action k (G or AD). Given those beliefs, subject i is modeled as 
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a a u  is the average payoff 
from taking action a when subject i is paired with j and takes action k. The parameter it λ  





it λ φ λ λ
1 − + =  with  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ i φ , and with  i
F λ  and  i
V λ  being positive and 
representing the fixed and variable parts of the scaling parameter. That is, we allow for 
the noise in decision making to decrease with experience. Finally,
a
it ε  is an idiosyncratic 
error term assumed to have a type I extreme value function. Given the distributional 










































. Thus the parameters to be estimated 
are
AD
i1 β , 
G
i1 β ,  i θ ,  i
F λ , i
V λ and  i φ . 
  The estimates are obtained via maximum likelihood estimation for each subject 
separately.
16 We have between 23 and 77 round 1 observations per subject. Subjects 
whose round 1 action is always the same are dropped from the estimation sample –this 
represents 19.55% of the data. Summary statistics of the estimates are presented in Table 
A1 in the appendix. 
  Note that we are not interested in the specific estimates of the learning model but 
that our focus is on the out of sample predictions we present in section 5.3.
17 However, 
there are several characteristics of the estimated model that are of interest. First, many 
subjects initially believe one strategy or the other is likely, but not both. Second, there is 
                                                 
16 An alternative would be to pool the data. However, for the purpose of this paper and given the number of 
observations per subjects, obtaining subject specific estimates seem reasonable. Fréchette (2005) discusses 
issues and solutions related to pooling data across subjects in estimating learning models and more 
specifically with respect to hypothesis testing. 
17 We have estimated simpler versions of the learning model and while the fit with the experimental data 
was decreased, the out of sample predictions were similar. This suggests that our prediction on the long run 
evolution of cooperation is robust to changes in the learning model and we expect that alternative models 
will generate similar qualitative results (see for instance Roth and Erev,1995, and Camerer and Ho, 1999).   20
a lot of variability in the discounting of past evidence. In some treatments many subjects 
look like they exhibit the Cournot dynamics while in others more subjects look like 
fictitious players. As δ and R increase subjects tend to pay more attention to the distant 
past, while for low δ and low R subjects tend to look only at the immediate past. Finally, 
note that the effect of experience in reducing noise tends to increase the larger δ and R 
are. 
  Correlations among the parameters also yield some additional insights. The fact 





i 1 1 β β + ) suggests that subjects who pay less attention to the far past have stronger 
initial beliefs. The positive correlation between  i θ  and  i φ  suggest that subjects who pay 
more attention to the far past have flatter scaling parameters across time. The negative 
correlation between i φ and the two terms of the scaling parameter ( i
F λ and i
V λ ) suggests 
that subjects with a greater initial scaling parameter have also a stepper scaling parameter 
across time. 
  Using these estimates we perform simulations to asses how well the learning 
model fits the data obtained in the experimental sessions. These simulations consist of 
1000 sessions by treatment using the learning model previously estimated and adding the 
subjects that always played the same action and assuming that they would do so 
irrespective of the choices of the subjects they are paired with. The session size is taken 
to be 14 (which is the closest to the mean session size).
18 The composition of each 
session is obtained by randomly drawing (with replacement) 14 subjects (and their 
estimated parameters) from the pool of subjects that participated in the corresponding 
treatment. Figure 2 displays the average simulated evolution of cooperation across 
repeated games by treatment (dashed line), in addition to the observed evolution (solid 
line). The vertical lines denote the end of each experimental session conducted in the lab. 
The doted lines denote the upper and lower bounds to the interval that includes 90% of 
the 1000 simulated sessions.  
  The simulations based on the estimated learning model track well the evolution of 
cooperation observed in the data. First, note that for every treatment in which cooperation 
                                                 
18 The results from the simulations are robust to the number of subjects per simulated session.   21
is lower (greater) in the last repeated game than in the first repeated game the same is true 
for the simulations. Second, the experimental data are largely within the 90% interval 
generated by the simulations. Finally, for the range of repeated games for which we have 
experimental data from all three sessions, the average level of cooperation in the 
simulations while obviously less noisy is generally similar to the observed levels with 
differences of 5% on average, but that never exceed 19%. 
 
5.3 Simulation of the evolution of cooperation in the long run 
  Given that the learning model fits the data well, we now extend the simulations to 
a longer range (1000 repeated games) to study how cooperation evolves in the long run. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average level of cooperation across the simulations 
and the 90% interval. 
  The results are consistent with those of the experimental sessions (most of the 
convergence in behavior happens in the first 100 repeated games). In the treatment in 
which cooperation cannot be supported in equilibrium the simulated levels of cooperation 
converge to one shot levels (less than 5%). In addition, the 90% interval includes full 
defection from very early repeated games and never includes full cooperation. In 
treatments in which cooperation can be supported in equilibrium but G is not risk 
dominant, cooperation decreases with experience, converging to levels close to those 
observed in one shot games. In this case as well, the 90% interval includes full defection 
from very early repeated games and excludes full cooperation. In fact no simulated 
session under these treatments achieved full cooperation in any repeated game. 
  In contrast, for the treatments in which cooperation can be supported in 
equilibrium and G is risk dominant cooperation may reach much higher levels. For two of 
the treatments in this group, δ=3/4 & R=40 and δ=3/4 & R=48, cooperation does reach 
high levels after subjects have gained experience and the 90% interval includes full 
cooperation after 30 repeated games. In the case of δ=3/4 & R=48 the mean level of 
cooperation is practically 100%. However, in the remaining treatment, δ=1/2 & R=48, 
cooperation remains between 40% and 50% and the 90% interval sometimes includes full 
defection but it never includes full cooperation. Thus, in treatments in which G is risk   22
dominant and with a large number of repeated games for subjects to gain experience, full 
cooperation may fail to arise. 
  Figure 4 shows the simulated distribution of cooperation by treatment. The figure 
shows for each treatment and repeated games 1 and 1000 the proportion of all the 
simulated sessions that have a given number of subjects (out of 14) choosing to cooperate 
in the first round. Figure 4 also shows the limit of the basins of attraction of G and AD 
for each treatment: for example under δ=3/4 & R=48 if the subject expects that 3 or more 
of the subjects in the session play G then G is the best response and AD is the best 
response otherwise. 
  The distributions of the number of cooperative actions are unimodal for every 
treatment in repeated game 1 and this mode is always located in the interior (from 4 
cooperative actions in δ=1/2 & R=32 and δ=3/4 & R=32 to 8 in δ=3/4 & R=48). The 
distribution of cooperative actions is quite different in repeated game 1000. In the 
treatment in which cooperation cannot be supported in equilibrium (δ=1/2 & R=32) the 
mode and median is full defection. In the treatments under which cooperation can be 
supported in equilibrium but is not risk dominant, the mode decreases with experience 
and converges to 1 cooperative action over 14 in a session. In the treatments in which 
cooperation is both an equilibrium action and risk dominant, the results are diverse. In the 
case of δ=1/2 & R=48 the distribution in repeated game 1000 is bimodal, with modes in 1 
and 11 cooperative actions over 14. This bifurcation in the evolution of cooperation 
resembles the continental divide results from the coordination games literature (see Van 
Huyck et al. 1997). For the other two treatments in this group (δ=3/4 & R=40 and δ=3/4 
& R=48) the distribution moves to higher levels of cooperation with experience with an 





  The series of experiments presented in this paper shed light on how cooperation 
evolves as subjects gain experience. We vary both the probability of continuation and the 
payoff from cooperation. We find that cooperation may not prevail even when it is a   23
possible equilibrium action. This provides a word of caution against the extended practice 
in applications of the theory of infinitely repeated games of assuming that subjects will 
cooperate whenever it is an equilibrium action. Moreover, cooperation may not prevail 
even under more stringent conditions (risk dominance) indicating how difficult it is for 
cooperation to prevail in repeated games. However, cooperation does prevail under some 
treatments –namely, when the probability of continuation and the payoff from 
cooperation are high enough. This evidence contradicts some equilibrium selection 
theories that select inefficient outcomes even when players are arbitrarily patient. We 
hope the evidence provided here will guide future theoretical attempts to study 
equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games.   24
Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Learning Model Estimates 
Mean 
Treatment P(G)  All  P(G)* θ  Φ  λ
F  λ
V 
δ=1/2 R=32  0.79  0.61 0.21 0.23 4.49E+13 1.33E+299 
δ=1/2 R=40  0.53  0.48 0.58 0.15 3.37 2.93E+304 
δ=1/2 R=48  0.46  0.40 0.82 0.10 1.94 2.21E+301 
δ=3/4 R=32  0.39  0.31 0.32 0.31 6.14E+17 7.46E+287 
δ=3/4 R=40  0.32  0.34 0.55 0.28 1.16 5.86E+280 
δ=3/4 R=48  0.25  0.47 0.32 0.06 3.10 3.4E+297 
           
Median 
Treatment P(G)  All  P(G)* θ  Φ  λ
F  λ
V 
δ=1/2 R=32  1.00  1.00 0.00 0.00 2.89 3.217E+36 
δ=1/2 R=40  0.71  0.53 0.64 0.00 1.85 2.973E+17 
δ=1/2 R=48  0.33  0.17 0.98 0.00 0.26 5.04E+102 
δ=3/4 R=32  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 2258.90 
δ=3/4 R=40  0.00  0.00 0.54 0.00 0.23 10.08 
δ=3/4 R=48  0.00  0.26 0.26 0.00 0.28 3.058E+71 
*Assigns P(G)=1 (0) to subject that always choose to cooperate (defect) in first 
round 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Cooperation by Treatment and Session (first rounds)
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Figure 2: Simulated Evolution of Cooperation Implied by the Learning Estimates
Note: solid lines represent experimental data, dashed lines the average simulated data, dotted lines the 90% interval of simulated data,
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Figure 4: Distribution of Outcomes in Simulated Sessions
Repeated Game 1 (dashed) vs. Repeated Game 1000 (solid). Vertical lines denotes limit of basins of attraction.